“Keep alive in your hearts
the feeling of confidence
that the light of knowledge
will inevitably dispel
the clouds of ignorance,
the conviction
that concern for justice
will ultimately conquer
hatred and enmity.
[... The] proper response to oppression
is neither to succumb in resignation
nor to take on the characteristics of the oppressor.
The victim of oppression
can transcend it
through an inner strength
that shields the soul
from bitterness and hatred
which sustains
consistent principled action.” UHJ 2009
There is such a contrast between the use of the term “principled action” when used here for healing the human spirit and the way it is used in writings referring to doing ethics, applied ethics, ethics talk. Is it about words or deeds?
“Keep alive in your hearts” calls to all of us to sustain consistent principled action freed from bitterness and hatred even when oppressed, refuse to resign to victimization, be careful not to respond to oppression by taking on the characteristics of the oppressor, struggle to continue to believe that knowledge will overcome ignorance, that justice will conquer injustice, nurture and maintain inner strength that will sustain us through the most ethically distressing dilemmas of our lives, nurture confidence when you feel doubt, seek knowledge instead of vengeance. This far transcends concepts of ethical codes and minimal ethical standards.
“Some people confuse acting in good conscience with “doing ethics”. While personal good conscience is necessary for acting ethically, it is not sufficient. There is also confusion of so-called “codes of ethics’ which are really codes of professional etiquette – for instance, between physicians or between lawyers – or which define unprofessional conduct, with codes of ethics properly so-called. Just because certain conduct does not breach professional norms, does not necessarily mean that it is ethical [...] “Doing ethics”, especially by an ethicist, requires one to undertake an informed structured analysis that will assist in the identification and prioritisation of the full range of values relevant to, or affected by, the various decision options that are open in any given situation. It is inevitable that one’s own values come into play, but they should be identified as such and the other people involved advised of this. I sometimes imagine that “doing ethics” can be compared with opening a beautiful, intricately painted fan. The struts are the different schools of ethics, or the fundamental bases of the alternative analyses that could be used. The fabric that joins the struts may display one or several scenes. When we all agree on the outcome, although we do so for different reasons, we are choosing a different location in the one scene. When we disagree on the outcome, we are identifying several scenes and arguing that one scene is fundamental and should take priority in setting the overall tone or interpretation of the painting that the artist has portrayed on the fan, and that the other scenes must be interpreted in light of this. We all need to learn how to do ethics, even if we do not always succeed in doing this. “Doing ethics” is not a simple task; it is a process, not an event; and, in many ways, no matter in which capacity or context we do ethics, it is a life-long learning experience. The most important requirement, however, is that we all engage in that process, that is, we all participate in “ethics talk” (Somerville 2006).“
Timeline
1884 Utilitarians have argued that the “truth about morality and justice is so complicated and controversial that it might be necessary to keep it hidden from most individuals’ awareness. For morality often requires much that is contrary to their personal interests. Also sometimes it’s just too complicated for people to understand why their moral duties require of them what they do. So long as they understand their individual duties, it may be better if they do not understand the principles and reasons behind them. So Sidgwick argues that the aims of utilitarianism might better be achieved if it remains an “esoteric morality,” knowledge of which is confined to “an enlightened few” (Sidgwick 1884: 89-90) John Rawls would argue against this in 1971 in A Theory of Justice describing how ”publicity and universality as necessary relates to the conception of the person implicit in justice as fairness. If we conceive of persons as free and equal moral persons capable of rational and moral autonomy, then they should not be under any illusions about the bases of their social relations, but should be able to understand and apply these principles in their deliberations about justice. These are important conditions of the freedom and autonomy (moral and political) of democratic citizens (Freeman 1996-2008. “Original Position.” SEP) .”
1908 John Dewey joined Tufts to write Ethics (1908), at the newly-founded University of Chicago. Dewey, Tufts, formed the core of the so-called “Chicago group” of psychology. According to wikipedia “John Dewey (1859 – 1952) was an American philosopher, psychologist, and educational reformer whose thoughts and ideas have been highly influential in the United States and around the world. Dewey, along with Charles Sanders Peirce and William James, is recognized as one of the founders of the philosophical school of pragmatism. He is also one of the founders of functional psychology and was a leading representative of the progressive movement in U.S. schooling during the first half of the 20th century. Although Dewey is best known for his works on education, he also wrote on a wide range of subjects, including experience and nature, art and experience, logic and inquiry, democracy, and ethics. In his advocacy of democracy, Dewey considered two fundamental elements—schools and civil society—as being key areas needing attention and reconstruction to encourage experimental intelligence and plurality. In the necessary reconstruction of civil society, Dewey asserted that full democracy was to be obtained not just by extending voting rights but also by ensuring that there exists a fully-formed public opinion, accomplished by effective communication among citizens, experts, and politicians, with the latter being held accountable for the policies they adopt.”
1950s Most Anglo-American philosophers were of the school of logical positivism. They considered ethical and political reflection on issues of justice and political authority was being outside the realm of philosophy. They did not study people’s need for norms by which to guide their lives or society To logical positivists the only two legitimate forms of philosophical inquiry were the investigation of empirical facts and debates on the meaning of words.
1960 Thomas Nagel (1937) earned his PhD from Harvard University under the supervision of John Rawls.
1963 Smart, J. J. C. 1963. Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Thomas Nagel (1974) considered Smart’s arguments as part of a wave of reductionist euphoria which produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction while completely neglecting the concept of consciousness which makes the mind-body problem really intractable.
1966 Lewis, David K. 1966. ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’ Journal of Philosophy, LXIII. Thomas Nagel (1974) considered Lewis’ arguments as part of a wave of reductionist euphoria which produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction while completely neglecting the concept of consciousness which makes the mind-body problem really intractable.
1967 Brenda Almond, a key figure in the ‘Applied Philosophy’ movement, was also linked to Gilbert Ryle, the Philosohpy Society’s great critic, through Ryle’s editorship of Mind. Ryle published a celebrated article on utilitarianism by Almond in 1967, “An Ethical Paradox”, which argued that to suppose ‘everybody ought to do what they think they ought to do’ was, as it were, paradoxical. The debate continued in Mind for many issues, and served to establish Almond’s philosophical credentials.
1967 Putnam, Hilary. 1967. ’Psychological Predicates’ in Art, Mind, & Religion, ed. W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press reprinted in Putnam, Hilary. 1967. ’The Nature of Mental States.’ Materialism ed. Rosenthal. Thomas Nagel (1974) considered Putman’s arguments as part of a wave of reductionist euphoria which produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction while completely neglecting the concept of consciousness which makes the mind-body problem really intractable.
1969 Dennett, D. C. 1969. Content and Consciousness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Nagel, Thomas. 1972. A Review of Dennett, Journal of Philosophy, LXIX . Thomas Nagel (1974) considered Dennett’s arguments as part of a wave of reductionist euphoria which produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction while completely neglecting the concept of consciousness which makes the mind-body problem really intractable.
1970 Only seven articles were published in English in the world that in the area that is now known as applied ethics (Somerville 2006)“.
1970 Kohlberg “would like to see people advance to the highest possible stage of moral thought. The best possible society would contain individuals who not only understand the need for social order (stage 4) but can entertain visions of universal principles, such as justice and liberty (stage 6)” as in the work of moral and political philosopher John Rawls (Kohlberg 1970 in Crain 1985).
1971 John Rawls (1921-2002) published’ A Theory of Justice, considered by many to be the most influential work in moral and political philosophy since WWII. Rawls’ theory of ‘justice as fairness” continues to shape the social and political life of North American society. Rawls used elements of both Kantian and utilitarian philosophy to describe a method for the moral evaluation of social and political institutions. His concept of Justice as Fairness, consists of the liberty principle, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle.
“The original position is a central feature of John Rawls’s social contract account of justice, “justice as fairness,” set forth in A Theory of Justice (TJ). It is designed to be a fair and impartial point of view that is to be adopted in our reasoning about fundamental principles of justice. In taking up this point of view, we are to imagine ourselves in the position of free and equal persons who jointly agree upon and commit themselves to principles of social and political justice. The main distinguishing feature of the original position is “the veil of ignorance”: to insure impartiality of judgment, the parties are deprived of all knowledge of their personal characteristics and social and historical circumstances. They do know of certain fundamental interests they all have, plus general facts about psychology, economics, biology, and other social and natural sciences. The parties in the original position are presented with a list of the main conceptions of justice drawn from the tradition of social and political philosophy, and are assigned the task of choosing from among these alternatives the conception of justice that best advances their interests in establishing conditions that enable them to effectively pursue their final ends and fundamental interests. Rawls contends that the most rational choice for the parties in the original position are the two principles of justice. The first principle guarantees the equal basic rights and liberties needed to secure the fundamental interests of free and equal citizens and to pursue a wide range of conceptions of the good. The second principle provides fair equality of educational and employment opportunities enabling all to fairly compete for powers and prerogatives of office; and it secures for all a guaranteed minimum of the all-purpose means (including income and wealth) that individuals need to pursue their interests and to maintain their self-respect as free and equal persons (Freeman 1996-2008. “Original Position.” SEP) .”
1970s Philosophers introduced the concept of moral standing to deal with controversial ethical issues: the treatment of animals, abortion, euthanasia, the environment. Based on the legal concept of legal standing which gives one the right to bring a claim before a court, a moral standing would give one the right that your claims must be heard. What qualifies one for a moral standing? Do animals, comatose persons, trees, fetuses all have moral standing? (Vaughn 2007:436-7).
1972 “The locus classicus of the early work on global distribution and global liberalism remains Peter Singer’s seminal 1972 article on the moral legitimacy of famine. Singer’s article remains influential, in part because of its singular potency in pointing to the gap between our moral principles and our practical agency in the area of international development. [...] Since Singer can be plausibly viewed as originating the internationalist movement within political philosophy. [...] Singer’s argument is potent, in part, because of its simplicity. It begins with two premises which, Singer thinks, are likely to be uncontroversially true: [S]uffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. [I]f it is within our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it. (Singer, 1985) in “International Justice” SEP.
1973 Mary Anne Warren famous article entitled “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion” (1973: 57:43-61.) was published in the Monist. In this essay she listed person-making qualities. She updated this in 1997. “The question which we must answer in order to produce a satisfactory solution to the problem of the moral status of abortion is this: How are we to define the moral community, the set of beings with full and equal moral rights, such that we can decide whether a human fetus is a member of this community or not? What sort of entity, exactly, has the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? Jefferson attributed these rights to all men, and it may or may not be fair to suggest that he intended to attribute them only to men. Perhaps he ought to have attributed them to all human beings. If so, then we arrive, first, at [John] Noonan’s problem of defining what makes a being human, and, second, at the equally vital question which Noonan does not consider, namely, What reason is there for identifying the moral community with the set of all human beings, in whatever way we have chosen to define that term (Warren 1973, 1996) ?” Warren offered these traits as those which are the “most central to the concept of personhood, or humanity in the moral sense, are, very roughly, the following: Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain; Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems); Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control); The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible topics; The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both (Warren 1973, 1996).” This essay was widely cited.
1974 Thomas Nagel. “What Is it Like to Be a Bat?“ Philosophical Review. October. LXXXIII: 4: 435-50. “Bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine. This appears to create difficulties for the notion of what it is like to be a bat. We must consider whether any method will permit us to extrapolate to the inner life of the bat from our own case,5 and if not, what alternative methods there may be for understanding the notion. [...] Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited.”
tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored.
“Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction (Examples are J. J. C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963); David K. Lewis, ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’, Journal of Philosophy, LXIII (1966), reprinted with addenda in David M. Rosenthal, Materialism & the Mind-Body Problem, (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1971); Hilary Putnam, ’Psychological Predicates’, in Art, Mind, & Religion, ed. W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), reprinted in Materialism, ed. Rosenthal, as ‘The Nature of Mental States’; D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968); D. C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969). I have expressed earlier doubts in ‘Armstrong on the Mind’, Philosophical Review, LXXIX (1970), 394-403; a review of Dennett, Journal of Philosophy, LXIX (1972); and chapter 11 above. See also Saul Kripke, ‘Naming and Necessity’. in Semantics of Natural Language, ed. D. Davidson and G. Harman (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), esp. pp. 334-42; and M. T. Thornton, ‘Ostensive Terms and Materialism’, The Monist, LVI (1972), 193-214.) But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oaktree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored. [...] Apart from its own interest, a phenomenology that is in this sense objective may permit questions about the physically basis of experience to assume a more intelligible form. Aspects of subjective experience that admitted this kind of objective description might be better candidates for objective explanations of a more familiar sort. But whether or not this guess is correct, it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective. Otherwise we cannot even pose the mind-body problem without sidestepping it. (Nagel 1974:435).”
1974 Armstrong, D. M. 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Thomas Nagel (1974) considered Smart’s arguments as part of a wave of reductionist euphoria which produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction while completely neglecting the concept of consciousness which makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Nagel expressed earlier doubts in ‘Armstrong on the Mind’. Philosophical Review, LXXIX (1970), 394-403.
1975 Controversial secular humanist Peter Singer wrote Animal Liberation regarded by some as the touchstone of the animal liberation movement. Not all members of the animal liberation movement share this view, and Singer himself has said the media overstates his status. His views on that and other issues in bioethics have attracted attention and a degree of controversy.” Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals, New York Review/Random House, New York, 1975; Cape, London, 1976; Avon, New York, 1977; Paladin, London, 1977; Thorsons, London, 1983. Harper Perennial Modern Classics, New York, 2009.
1980 There were approximately fourteen speciality journals in the same area of applied ethics (Somerville 2006)“.
1985 Tom Regan’s article entitled “The Case for Animal Rights” was published in Peter Singer’s In Defense of Animals. Regan called for “the total abolition of the use of animals in science; the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture; the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping.” Regan rejected the concept that “animals are human resources — “to be eaten, or surgically manipulated, or exploited for sport or money.” He argued that animal rights has reason, not just emotion, on its side. He argued that Rawls theory of justice applied to animals on an equal level with humans. “Whatever ethical theory we should accept rationally, therefore, it must at least recognize that we have some duties directly to animals, just as we have some duties directly to each other.” “All who have inherent value have it equally, whether they be human animals or not.”
1986 Peter Singer published Applied Ethics (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986.
1986 Paul W. Taylor published Respect for Nature in which he argued for a biocentric outlook on nature that did not place humans at the top of a hierarchical order.
1988 Among those present at the World Congress of Philosophy held in Brighton were A.J. Ayer, Karl Popper, Donald Davidson, Michael Dummett, R.M. Hare and John Passmore World Congress of Philosophy. The ‘use’ of philosophy was discussed at this Conference, something seen as particularly relevant since that year seven university philosophy departments had been closed throughout Britain, including that of the Society’s illustrious Vice President, Brenda Almond, a key figure in the ‘Applied Philosophy’ movement.
1990 There were over 200 centres engaged in teaching, research or practice in applied ethics in North America alone (Somerville “doing ethics”” http://www.philia.ca/files/pdf/DoingEthics.pdf).
1993 Rawls, John Rawls published Political Liberalism.
1996 Seyla Benhabib wrote The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt in which he critiqued the work of Arendt for its roots in the 1920s German “Existenz philosophy” Martin Heidegger. Although she radically transformed these philosophical categories into something original through her experience as a stateless and persecuted Jew (restoring the concept of “being-in-the-world-with” to the center of our experience) Benhabib argued that Arendt failed in disentangling normative justification from moral intuitionism (Orlie 1997).
2004-06 Claude Fussler of The World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Aron Cramer of Business for Social Responsibility and Sebastian van der Vegt from International Labour Organization co-edited Raising the Bar: Creating Value with the United Nations Global Compact. (2004)
2006 The numbers of centres engaged in teaching, research or practice in applied ethics continued to increase in countries around the globe, most notably in Asia and countries such as Iran (Somerville 2006).“
2006 Ethics talk, in scientific research, academia, business, industry, government, health care, the media, or, prominently in light of the upcoming Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy (2006), sport, is main stream (Somerville 2006).“
2006 Margaret Somerville delivered the 2006 CBC Massey Lectures, The Ethical Imagination: Journeys of the Human Spirit (http://www.philia.ca.”
Who’s Who
Brenda Almond is Emeritus Professor of Moral and Social Philosophy at the University of Hull. She is President of the Philosophical Society of England and Vice-President of the Society for Applied Philosophy. Her books include:The Fragmenting Family, Exploring Ethics: a traveller’s tale, Moral Concerns, and The Philosophical Quest. Studied philosophy under A.J. Ayer at University College, University of London. She subsequently held lectureships in philosophy at universities in England and in W. Africa (Ghana), as well as visiting appointments in the USA and Australia . She has lectured widely in Europe and the Far East. She moved from Surrey University to the University of Hull in 1986 and was appointed Professor of Moral and Social Philosophy there in 1992. Brenda Almond is known for her involvement in the promotion of applied philosophy and applied ethics. She was a founding member of the Society for Applied Philosophy and Founding Joint Editor (with Anthony O’Hear) of theJournal of Applied Philosophy. She is the author of a number of books in the areas of philosophy, ethics (including bioethics) and education. She is also the editor of the book series ‘Contemporary Ethical Debates’, published by Edinburgh University Press. Honours received by Brenda Almond include an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Utrecht, where she also held the Belle van Zuylen Chair, and elected foreign Membership of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. She has served on the HFEA (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority) and the HGC (Human Genetics Commission). She is President of the Philosophical Society of England , Vice-President of the Society for Applied Philosophy, a member of the Executive Committee and the Council of the Royal Institute of Philosophy and of the European Society for Ethical Research.
Seyla Benhabib (1996) The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt.
Andrew I. Cohen, Jean Beer Blumenfeld Center for Ethics, Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University, PO Box 4089, Atlanta, GA
Claude Fussler of The World Business Council for Sustainable Development was the editor of Raising the Bar: Creating Value with the United Nations Global Compact. (2004)
Aron Cramer of Business for Social Responsibility Raising the Bar: Creating Value with the United Nations Global Compact. (2004-06).
Sebastian van der Vegt from International Labour Organization Raising the Bar: Creating Value with the United Nations Global Compact. (2004-06).
Margaret Somerville “is Samuel Gale Professor of Law, Professor in the Faculty of Medicine, and Founding Director of the Centre for Medicine, Ethics and Law at McGill University, Montreal. She has an extensive national and international publishing and speaking record and is a frequent commentator in all forms of media. In 2003 she became the first recipient of the UNESCO Avicenna Prize for Ethics in Science. Most recently she delivered the 2006 CBC Massey Lectures, The Ethical Imagination: Journeys of the Human Spirit, which are also published as a book by House of Anansi Press (Somerville 2006).“
Peter Singer “Peter Singer is best known for his book Animal Liberation (1975), which is the founding declaration, the manifesto, and the Bible of the animal rights movement. Singer is still in the forefront of the struggle against “speciesism,” the wrongful discrimination against animals. His more recent writings on the morality of vegetarianism are an inspiration to many thoughtful readers. A respected Princeton philosopher, Peter Singer has repeatedly been involved in controversy, as some have declared themselves offended by his bold conclusions. In Germany his lectures were closed down by people who mistakenly thought he was reviving Nazi thinking on eugenics (Singer’s parents were Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany). Conservative publisher and Princeton alum Steve Forbes canceled his generous donations to Princeton University when Singer was appointed professor of bioethics in 1999. Singer is also well-known as a fighter against world poverty, who maintains that people in the rich countries should donate part of their income to help people in the poorest countries (Singer himself donates twenty-five percent). Among Singer’s controversial positions: Unfairly discriminating against animals is “speciesism,” which is just as indefensible as racism; Animals should not be used for experiments except where the benefit to humans outweighs the harm done to the animals; It is morally indefensible to live in comfort while others starve, unless one donates part of one’s income to alleviate world hunger; An infant is not a person, and killing an infant is not morally the same as killing a person; Killing fetuses or infants with severe disabilities is sometimes morally justified; ”Brain death” is a bogus category disguising the biological fact that people taken off life support are still alive, and we should therefore abandon any commitment to “the sanctity of human life.” (OpenCourt 2009) Jeffrey A. Schaler, professor in the Department of Justice, Law, and Society at American University’s School of Public Affairs in Washington, D.C. He is the Executive Editor of Current Psychology: Developmental, Learning, Personality, Social, published Peter Singer Under Fire (2009-06).
Paul W. Taylor is a philosopher best known for his work in the field of environmental ethics. His theory of biocentric egalitarianism, was first published in his 1986 book Respect for Nature, and is taught in many university courses on environmental ethics. He is professor emeritus in philosophy at Brooklyn College, City University of New York.
Thomas Nagel (1937-) [editing in process . . .] is a professor of philosophy at New York University. He is well-known for his critique of reductionist accounts of the mind (The question, though often attributed to Nagel, was originally posed by Timothy L.S. Sprigge.) This article was originally published in 1974 in the journal The Philosophical Review but has since been reprinted in several books that are concerned with consciousness and the mind, such as The Mind’s Iby Daniel Dennett and Douglas Hofstadter. (Also reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, edited by Ned Block and the book Mortal Questions.), and for his contributions to deontological and liberal moral and political theory in The Possibility of Altruism (1970) and subsequent writings. He is known within philosophy of mind as an advocate of the idea that consciousness and subjective experience cannot be reduced to brain activity. One of his most famous articles is “What is it like to be a bat?”Nagel first argued that the subjective experience of consciousness can never be attained through the objective methods of reductionistic science. Second, Nagel concluded that because of the general problem of subjective experience, “we cannot even pose the mind-body problem” in a sensible way and “it seems unlikely that a physical theory of mind can be contemplated.” While many philosophers of mind and cognitive neuroscientists accept the fundamental distinction between the subjective and the objective, they often have not accepted Nagel’s dismal conclusions. For example, philosophers and biologists such as Daniel Dennett and Gerald Edelman have gone ahead and proposed theories of mind and consciousness. For many years, Nagel has conducted a seminar noted for a dazzling array of guest speakers with his colleague Ronald Dworkin (BiographyBase).”
Lewis Vaughn, secular, rational, humanist,
Various authors glossaries of some key concepts
Applied ethics Applied ethics includes subfields: Bioethics, Medical ethics, Neuroethics, Business ethics, Hospitality ethics, Environmental ethics (e.g. global warming), Human rights issues (e.g. gender ethics / sexism, classism, racism, Capital punishment), Animal rights issues, Legal ethics, Computer ethics, Media ethics / journalism ethics, Research ethics, Marketing ethics,
Education ethics, Sports ethics, Military ethics (e.g. just war theory), International ethics (e.g. world hunger), Public administration ethics
Doing ethics “Some people confuse acting in good conscience with “doing ethics”. While personal good conscience is necessary for acting ethically, it is not sufficient. Doing ethics” “There is also confusion of so-called “codes of ethics’ which are really codes of professional etiquette – for instance, between physicians or between lawyers – or which define unprofessional conduct, with codes of ethics properly so-called. Just because certain conduct does not breach professional norms, does not necessarily mean that it is ethical [...] “Doing ethics”, especially by an ethicist, requires one to undertake an informed structured analysis that will assist in the identification and prioritisation of the full range of values relevant to, or affected by, the various decision options that are open in any given situation. It is inevitable that one’s own values come into play, but they should be identified as such and the other people involved advised of this. I sometimes imagine that “doing ethics” can be compared with opening a beautiful, intricately painted fan. The struts are the different schools of ethics, or the fundamental bases of the alternative analyses that could be used. The fabric that joins the struts may display one or several scenes. When we all agree on the outcome, although we do so for different reasons, we are choosing a different location in the one scene. When we disagree on the outcome, we are identifying several scenes and arguing that one scene is fundamental and should take priority in setting the overall tone or interpretation of the painting that the artist has portrayed on the fan, and that the other scenes must be interpreted in light of this. We all need to learn how to do ethics, even if we do not always succeed in doing this. “Doing ethics” is not a simple task; it is a process, not an event; and, in many ways, no matter in which capacity or context we do ethics, it is a life-long learning experience. The most important requirement, however, is that we all engage in that process, that is, we all participate in “ethics talk”.(Somerville 2006).“
Ethics Lewis Vaughn (2007:544) provides this definition under “ethics” in his glossary “(moral philosophy) – the philosophical study of morality.”
Ethical distress Somerville (2006) used Professor Nuala Kenny’s term “ethical distress” which transpires when “a person involved in a situation firmly believes that there is a breach of ethics occurring, but does not have the authority to stop this. For instance, a junior nurse observes certain conduct towards a patient in a hospital, that she regards as unethical, but she has no power to intervene (Somerville 2006).“
Metaethics – Lewis Vaughn (2007:544) provides this definition under “metaethics” in his glossary “the study of meaning and logical structure of moral beliefs.”
Moral agency A moral agent (eg. a competent and reasonably mature human being) as opposed to an amoral agent (like an act of nature, earthquake, volcano) is one whose actions are capable of moral evaluation. Non-human animals are generally understood to be amoral and therefore their actions cannot be evaluated morally. This is argued by animal rights activists who claim animals have moral standing and therefore moral rights.
Eckart argued that nation states are also moral agents. “Despite considerable moral and material differences among states, the concept of sovereign equality permeates international relations theory and, in particular, normative international relations theory. Most traditions of international ethics incorporate the idea of equality. John Rawls’s Law of Peoples is representative of this tendency. The states party to Rawls’s contractual model of international justice are assumed to be equal. Despite the inequalities among states, the choice to model states as equals is justified to the extent that they all possess some degree of moral agency. As moral agents, states possess an inherent equality that justifies modeling them as equal. Nevertheless, states as equal moral agents would take into account certain aspects of international inequality. In particular, they could recognize the role that Great Powers can play in maintaining order and establishing the preconditions for international justice. This piece explores the extent of equality in normative international relations theory” ["ome of the ideas presented in this paper were initially developed over the summer of 2004 in Jack Donnelly's international relations theory reading group at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver. Eckert acknowledged the importance of her conversations with Alan Gilbert on the present work (particularly given his own commitments to egalitarianism and democratic internationalist resistance to the very real injustices of the state system] (Eckert 2006).”
Moral community, moral standing “How are we to define the moral community, the set of beings with full and equal moral rights, such that we can decide whether a human fetus is a member of this community or not? What sort of entity, exactly, has the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? Jefferson attributed these rights to all men, and it may or may not be fair to suggest that he intended to attribute them only to men. Perhaps he ought to have attributed them to all human beings. If so, then we arrive, first, at [John] Noonan’s problem of defining what makes a being human, and, second, at the equally vital question which Noonan does not consider, namely, What reason is there for identifying the moral community with the set of all human beings, in whatever way we have chosen to define that term (Warren 1973, 1996) ?” Warren offered these traits as those which are the “most central to the concept of personhood, or humanity in the moral sense, are, very roughly, the following: Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain; Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems); Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control); The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible topics; The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both (Warren 1973, 1996).” This essay was widely cited.
Moral standing Philosophers introduced the concept of moral standing in the 1970s to deal with controversial ethical issues: the treatment of animals, abortion, euthanasia, the environment. Based on the legal concept of legal standing which gives one the right to bring a claim before a court, a moral standing would give one the right that your claims must be heard. What qualifies one for a moral standing? Do animals, comatose persons, trees, fetuses all have moral standing? (Vaughn 2007:436-7).
A being’s moral standing determines the extent to which its well-being must be ethically considered for its own sake. To say that some group of beings have moral standing is to say that, as a moral matter, their well-being must be given some consideration. It does not decide the question of whether they have the same moral standing as people (and thus have “human” rights).
Andrew I. Cohen, of the Jean Beer Blumenfeld Center for Ethics, Department of Philosophy at Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA argued that “Contractarianism roots moral standing in an agreement among rational agents in the circumstances of justice. Critics have argued that the theory must exclude nonhuman animals from the protection of justice. I argue that contractarianism can consistently accommodate the notion that nonhuman animals are owed direct moral consideration. They can acquire their moral status indirectly, but their claims to justice can be as stringent as those among able-bodied rational adult humans. Any remaining criticisms of contractarianism likely rest on a disputable moral realism; contractarianism can underwrite the direct moral considerability of nonhuman animals by appealing to a projectivist quasi-realism (Cohen 2007).”
Applied ethics: Margaret Somerville (2006) provided this brief history of the field of study called applied ethics: “The rapid development of the field of applied ethics is often referred to as the “ethics explosion”. In 1970, in the entire world, only seven articles were published in English in the area that we would now call applied ethics. In 1980, there were approximately fourteen speciality journals in the same area. And by 1990, there were over 200 centres engaged in teaching, research or practice in applied ethics in North America alone. That number has continued to increase with ethics centres being set up in countries around the globe, most notably in Asia and countries such as Iran. One has only to pick up the daily newspapers to note the perceived relevance of “ethics talk” to much of what goes on in our communities, whether in scientific research, academia, business, industry, government, health care, the media, or, prominently in light of the upcoming Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy, sport (http://www.philia.ca.”
“Virtue ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry (2003-07-18 – 2007-07-08) “Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximise well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent. Three of virtue ethics’ central concepts, virtue, practical wisdom and eudaimonia are often misunderstood. Once they are distinguished from related but distinct concepts peculiar to modern philosophy, various objections to virtue ethics can be better assessed (SEC).”
Folksonomy, taxonomy
applied ethics, Business Role, corporate social responsibility, CSR, principled action, human rights, vision, decision-making, allocating resources, allocating limited resources, product’s ethical impact, consumer, ethical intelligence, compliance, minimum ethical standards, Global Compact, The World Business Council for Sustainable Development,
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